PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT LOCHNER: TOWARD
A TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE UNCORRUPTED
BY SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
GLEN E. SUMMERSt
INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
The two
taken for public use, without just compensation."'
preceding clauses, commonly referred to respectively as the Due
Process Clause and the Takings Clause, have long been the focus of
an historic battle over the proper scope of constitutional protection
of private property rights. The academic and jurisprudential
debates over the proper meaning and functions of the two clauses
have generated a voluminous body of literature and case law. 2 Yet
despite all the spilled ink, prominent academics and jurists continue
to confuse the distinct functions of the Due Process and Takings Clauses
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The portion of the quotation appearing before the
semicolon shall, in accord with common parlance, hereinafter be referred to as the
"Due Process Clause." The part of the quotation following the semicolon shall
hereinafter be referred to as the "Takings Clause," although it has also been termed
the "Eminent Domain Clause" and the "JustCompensation Clause" by some authors.
2 Some of the more widely recognized discussions of the takings issue are: BRUCE
A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)
[hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS];JohnJ. Costonis, Presumptive and PerSe Takings: A
DecisionalModelfor the Takingissue,58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1983); Richard A. Epstein,
Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 1; Frank I. Michelman, Property
as a ConstitutionalRight, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097 (1981); Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman,Just Compensation];
Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971);
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter Sax,
Police Power].
'See Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1607 n.40
(1988) ("[J]udges and commentators have [not] always maintained a clear distinction
between the 'due process' and 'takings' inquiries. . . .");see also William B. Stoebuck,
Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057, 1081 (1980)
(decrying the failure to give proper place to due process).
A principal thesis of this Comment is that the Due Process and Takings Clauses
of the U.S. Constitution have quite distinct and independent functions. While at first
glance this position might appear to be rather basic, the following analysis will
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The failure of jurists and academics to keep the respective roles
of the Due Process and Takings Clauses in proper perspective has
contributed to what is best described as the "blending" of due
process analysis into takings jurisprudence. 4
This Comment
provides an historical explanation of the source of this "blending."
It also examines the most significant instances of this "blending" of
Due Process and Takings Clause analysis, and suggests that the
public use limitation, the substantial relation test, and balancing
tests are all out of place in the field of takings jurisprudence, for
they do nothing more than resurrect principles of substantive due
process long ago discredited as unworkable judicial usurpations of
legislative power.5
Moreover, this Comment suggests that all

demonstrate that even distinguished constitutional scholars have failed to keep it in
mind. Some scholars have even advanced the proposition that analysis under the
Takings Clause should either be subsumed by, or made indistinguishable from, that
under the Due Process Clause. For examples of such approaches, see FRANK R.
STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS OF LAw: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE
207 (1986) [hereinafter STRONG, DICHOTOMY] (encouragingJustice O'Connor to take
"the ultimate intellectual step of fusing the clauses into an operational unity");
Randall T. Shepard, Land Use Regulation in the Rehnquist Court: The Fifth Amendment
and Judicial Intervention, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 847, 866-69 (1989) (assuming the
fungibility of the two clauses by advocating use of the Due Process Clause rather than
the Takings Clause as a means of challenging government regulation); Frank R.
Strong, On PlacingProperty Due ProcessCenter Stage in TakingsJurisprudence,49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 591 (1988) [hereinafter Strong, Due Process](criticizing those who have "failed
to grasp the genius of [Justice] Holmes" who properly supported the interconnection
between takings and due process jurisprudence).
" See Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1081. Professor Stoebuck describes "blending" in
the following way:
Many decisions strike down land-use regulations on the stated ground that
they are "arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory, and void" or some similar
phrase. Analysis of these words shows that "arbitrary" refers to a governmental act that lacks due process and is thus "void." "Confiscatory" is, of
course, a code word for "taking." "Unreasonable" refers to acts that lack
due process.... The best that can be said of decisions that blend due
process and eminent domain concepts is that they do not carefully analyze
the words; it is not reasoning but a substitute for reasoning-little more than
surplusage.... [A] decision ostensibly based on such vacuous language is
scarcely better than an arbitrary conclusion.
Id. (footnote omitted). Although I have borrowed the term "blending" from
Professor Stoebuck, I use the term in a somewhat more expansive sense. In this work
"blending" refers not only to the amalgamation of Due Process and Takings Clause
language in unclearjudicial opinions, but also to the more fundamentally problematic
transplantation of whole forms of due process analysis into takingsjurisprudence. I
believe that the two problems are sufficiently interrelated that they should be treated
together as a single phenomenon. To a certain extent, it has been the "blending" of
due process and takings language in olderjudicial opinions which has led more recent
scholars and jurists to mistakenly treat due process cases as Takings Clause cases.
' It is now academic that the substantive due process doctrine associated with
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inquiry into either the "ends" or the "means-ends fit" of government
regulation should only be conducted under the rubric of due
process. Although heightened "ends" or "means-end" scrutiny may
promise greater protection of private property rights,6 it may also
ultimately doom takings jurisprudence to the same fate as Lochnerstyle substantive due process.
While other commentators have identified the "blending" of
Due Process and Takings Clause analysis, they have done little more
than identify the phenomenon and note that "such mixtures of
issues generally have been regarded as analytically untidy and
problematic," 7 or that "[c]onfusion over the proper role of substantive due process and over the relationship between due process and
takings is a pervasive problem in judicial decisions and in scholarly
writing."8
This Comment goes further in several respects. First, it
identifies the forces that fostered this "blending" phenomenon.
Second, it traces the case law and proves that, as an historical
matter, several elements of modern takings jurisprudence were
directly borrowed from due process cases. Third, it shows how
Lochnerwas rejected by the Court in the 1930s. See United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 & n.4 (1938) (employing the "rational relation" test); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage
legislation); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("[A] state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare.").
The most poignant criticism of substantive due process is probably Justice Holmes's
dissent in Lochneritself. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,74-76 (1905) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
6 Property rights merit the same degree of protection as other forms of personal
liberties, not only because they encourage efficient resource allocation, but because
all other personal liberties are potentially threatened if the individual is denied the
means or resources to exercise them. For a modern illustration of this view, see
DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION

147, 246-47 (1993)

(noting that a majority of the justices of the California Supreme Court "support the
classically liberal notion.., that property is a guarantor of privacy"). For a different
view, see C. Edwin Baker, Property andIts Relation to ConstitutionallyProtectedLiberty,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1986). Baker criticizes the "most progressive members of the
Court," for "arguing 'that the dichotomy between personal liberties and property
rights is a false one.'" Id. at 742 n.2 (quoting Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
U.S. 538, 552 (1972)). In defense of the "most progressive members of the Court,"
it should be noted thatJudge Learned Hand believed that "[t]he right not to have
property taken withoutjust compensation has... the same constitutional dignity as
... freedom of the press or freedom of speech." LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 52 (1964).
7 Michelman, supra note 3, at 1607 n.40.
8 Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1081.
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recent cases such as Nollan v. Calfornia Coastal Commission9 and
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council ° have perpetuated this
problem. Finally, it demonstrates the true risks associated with this
"blending"-principally that it (1) subjects takings jurisprudence to
the same problems and criticisms which ultimately destroyed
Lochner-style substantive due process, 11 and (2) diverts attention
from the central question of what constitutes a "taking."
The diversion of attention from the core issue of what constitutes a "taking" is not without consequences. If a workable body of
regulatory takings law is not developed within a reasonable period
of time, courts and commentators will likely conclude that the
application of the Takings Clause to anything but the outright
exercise of eminent domain is too difficult and hopelessly unprincipled to demand judicial attention.12
Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of the
development of takings jurisprudence, placing emphasis on the
social and historical factors which sparked its development. The
Section demonstrates that the late development of takings jurisprudence, against the background of a more mature substantive due
process model, made takingsjurisprudence highly susceptible to due
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
10112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
" Modern social theory almost uniformly rejects the premises of the Lochner era.
See C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of
Equal Protection, 131 If. PA. L. REV. 933, 944-45 (1983) (approving the Court's shift
away from Lochner-style social theory). For a rejection of Lochner from a different
perspective, seeJ. Clifford Wallace, Interpretingthe Constitution: The CaseforJudicial
Restraint, 71 JUDICATURE 81, 83 (1987) (describing the noninterpretivist judicial
approach as vague, subjective, and ill-suited for the formation of broad social policy).
" A significant number of commentators have already given up hope of crafting
a novel doctrine to govern the issue of regulatory takings. Many have concluded that
legislation is the only answer. See e.g.,JohnJ. Costonis, "Fair"Compensationand the
Accommodation of Power: Antidotesfor the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 1021, 1081 (1975) (arguing that legislative initiatives in the area of
takings would serve the interests of the courts, regulatory authorities, and the private
sector); Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63, 63 (describing Supreme
Court doctrine on the law of expropriation as a "crazy-quilt pattern"); MichelmanJust
Compensation,supra note 2, at 1246-53 (explaining courts' inability to stake out limits
of fair treatment and the need for legislatures to intervene); Arvo Van Alstyne, Taking
or Damaging by PolicePower:. The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1971) (characterizing as confusing and incompatible judicial efforts to
establish a test "for determining when police power measures impose constitutionally
compensable losses"). Of course, while legislation can require compensation in cases
in which the Constitution does not, legislation cannot reduce the constitutional
requirements of the Takings Clause. See Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1080 & n.98.
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process influences. Part I culminates in a discussion of the
landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,13 and shows that
Holmes's opinion for the Court recognized neither a public use
limitation, nor any form of balancing test.
Part II identifies three examples of the blending of due process
and takings analysis: (1) the public use limitation, (2) the substantial
relationship test of Nollan v. Caiffornia Coastal Commission, and (3)
balancing. First, it demonstrates that the public use limitation was
directly borrowed from due process, and that the cases usually cited
as recognizing such a limitation were decided strictly on due process
grounds. After addressing the continuing problems associated with
the public use limitation and explaining that the requirement serves
no purpose other than to confuse state courts, it asserts that the
public use limitation should be abandoned altogether. Second, it
argues that the substantial relationship test of Nollan v. Calffornia
Coastal Commission 4 has only dubious support in the case law and
is subject to a number of criticisms. In particular, it asserts that the
substantial relationship test does nothing more than create an
exception to the minimum rationality standard of due process.
Third, Part II suggests that balancing fails as a takings methodology
because (1) the regulated individual's interests are not in conflict
with those of society, (2) it does not adequately reflect the framers'
concern for fairness, and (3) it subjects takings jurisprudence to the
criticisms of Lochner without addressing the central question of who
should bear the costs of regulation.
Unlike Parts I and II, which are largely historical and retrospective in nature, Part III provides a more prospective discussion of the
possible future of takings jurisprudence. First, it attempts to
suggest a rationale for the substantial relationship test which can be
reconciled both with the social norms inherent in the famous
Carolene Products footnote and with the position advanced in this
Comment that all review of the "means-end fit" of a regulation
should be conducted under the rubric of due process. Second, Part
III examines the Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council." Although it applauds the opinion for its implicit
rejection of balancing, it proposes that the test established by Lucas
is less meaningful than one might hope. It also points to question13 260

U.S. 393 (1922).

14 483

U.S. 825 (1987).

15

112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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able language in the opinion which detracts from the otherwise
positive step it takes.
I. THE GENESIS OF A MUDDLED TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE:
THE SOURCES OF "BLENDING"
The following Section discusses the forces which fostered the
blending of due process and takings analysis. Part A outlines the
overarching social and legal developments which made takings
jurisprudence susceptible to due process influences. Part B then
demonstrates how the failure of early opinions, such as Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, to adequately distinguish their due process
analysis from their takings analysis has allowed later courts and
observers to attribute due process tests to the Takings Clause.
A. The Social and Legal Dynamics Which Made Takings
JurisprudenceSusceptible to Due
Process Influences
Compared to other areas of constitutional law, most of takings
jurisprudence is of relatively recent vintage. During the first
century of the republic, the federal government acted more as landgrantor than land-grabber. 6 With a fairly sparse population and
a vast expanse of western land yet to be settled, the federal government freely gave land to the railroads, homesteaders, and state
governments.' 7 Moreover, the scope of the federal government's
regulatory activity remained remarkably small; it engaged in little
regulation of land use.'" Interestingly, the federal government did
not even assert its own power of eminent domain until 1875.1" In
addition, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment had no
application to acts of state governments before the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868. ° In this context, the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment received scant attention, for there

16

For a good general discussion of the various ways in which the federal

government made grants of land, see ROBERT E. RIEGEL & ROBERT G. ATHEARN,

AMERICA MovEs WEST 381-84 (5th ed. 1971).
17 See id. at 381-84, 493-508.
18 See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 114-15 (1973).
19
See Note, The Public Use Limitationon Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
YALE L.J. 599, 599-600 & nn.2-3 (1949) [hereinafter Note, The Public Use Limitation].
20 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (holding that the
Takings Clause is not applicable to state legislation).
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seldom existed either the need or the opportunity for litigants to
invoke it.2
In response to the social difficulties created by the industrial
revolution and the rapid industrialization of the United States in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, state governments began to
take a more active role in the regulation of economic affairs,
including the regulation of working hours and conditions under the
ill-defined, but ever expansive, "police power."2 2 Similarly, President Roosevelt's New Deal legislation catapulted the federal
government to prominence in the field of socio-economic regulation. The federal courts, however, true to their conservative,
counter-majoritarian tradition, and steeped in the political philosophy of John Locke and Adam Smith, resisted such assaults on
economic freedom. 2 The courts raised the Due Process and
Contract Clauses 24 of the United States Constitution as swords to
strike down social welfare legislation and other forms of economic
regulation. 25 Armed with the Due Process and Contract Clauses,
courts found not only state wage and workday restrictions to be easy
26
prey, but also thoroughly impeded the first New Deal programs.
Stymied by the Court's invalidation of his New Deal programs,
yet desperate to lead the nation out of the Great Depression,
21

See Note, TakingBack Takings: A CoaseanApproach to Regulation, 106 HARV. L.

REv. 914, 918 (1993).
1 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63 (1905) (noting an increase in the
regulation of trade and working conditions). For an historic discussion of the nature

of the police power, see ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3 (1904) (stating that the police power "aims directly to

secure and promote the public welfare").
2 As one scholar has explained: "By forging constitutional doctrines under the
Contracts Clause ... giving constitutional status to "vested rights," this line of
intellectual development sought basically to limit the ability of the legal system-more
specifically, of the legislature-to bring about redistributions of wealth." MORTONJ.
Hoawrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 255 (1977).
2' The Contract Clause states that "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Unlike the Due Process and
Takings Clauses, the Contract Clause applied to acts of state governments before the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was designed principally to protect
creditors from politically popular debtor relief laws, and was interpreted by the Court
to do that, as well as to protect private property in various other manners. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrTUnONAL LAW 613-28 (2d ed. 1988).
25

See JoHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-54 (4th

ed. 26
1991).
See id.; see also ROBERT H.JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FORJUDICIAL SUPREMACY 86235 (1941) (providing a detailed account of the crisis created by the Court's
opposition to the New Deal); WILLIAM LASSER, THE LIMITS OFJUDICIAL POWER 111-60
(1988) (same).
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President Roosevelt threatened to increase the size of the Supreme
Court from nine justices to as many as fifteen in order to achieve a
sympathetic majority.27
Roosevelt's "court-packing" scheme
eventually failed, largely because the Court quickly came to reject
the doctrine of substantive due process in the economic context
28
(and the analogous use of the Contract Clause).
Thanks principally to its relative obscurity and quiet history, the
Takings Clause emerged from this doctrinal shift, and reversal of
judicial philosophy, essentially unscathed. With the gradual increase
in the use of zoning and other forms of land use restrictions,
however, the Takings Clause became a more important tool for
property owners anxious to forestall government intervention. The
importance of the Takings Clause was further enhanced by the
absence of the Due Process and Contract Clauses as tools to
invalidate economic legislation. 2' Regulations which might once
have been challenged primarily as violating principles of substantive
due process could still be challenged under the Takings Clause.
Indeed, creative litigators soon recognized that a variety of
°
economic regulations could be likened to a taking of property.3
With the demise of Lochner-style substantive due process in the
1930s,"1 the Takings Clause gradually emerged as the only remaining tool for invalidating regulations which interfered with property
rights. 2 Unlike other constitutional doctrines which had been
See LASSER, supra note 26, at 153-54 (discussing Roosevelt's court-packing plan).
28 Until the late nineteenth century, the Contract Clause was actually the
"principal provision the Court used to void legislation that infringed on private
property rights." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 394; see also TRIBE, supra
note 24, at 588 (noting that in the nineteenth century "the contract clause of article
I, § 10, was soon located as the centerpiece of the Constitution's protective armor").
Although the scope of the Due Process and Contract Clauses are different, the level
of scrutiny accorded each has, in large part, developed similarly. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 394-409.
2 See TRIBE, supra note 24, at 587 (explaining that "[w]ith the demise of the
Lochnerera ... there began a search for alternative methods of protecting individuals
from majoritarian oppression").
Professor Tribe suggests that "two sets of restraints on governmental power"
which had "antedated and informed the Lochner era" continued to retain vitality in
the post-Lochner era. Id. He identifies these restraints as the norms of "regularity"
and "repose," the former "expressed primarily through the ex post facto clauses, the
bill of attainder clauses, and the procedural due process requirement" and the later
reflected in takings jurisprudence. Id.
s See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
s See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
32 While attempts have been made to use the Equal Protection Clause and certain
other constitutional provisions to invalidate economic regulation, they have generally
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subject to frequent litigation and judicial interpretation, takings
jurisprudence was largely undeveloped. The Supreme Court had
addressed the regulatory takings problem in only a handful of cases.
In fact, only two opinions had actually attempted to establish
generally applicable principles of takings clausejurisprudence at the
time substantive due process met its demise: (1) Mugler v. Kansas," holding that a regulation enacted pursuant to the police
power is never a taking;3 4 and (2) Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 5 holding that a regulation constitutes a taking if it "goes
too far."

6

While the Court had addressed the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, Co.,8 7 Zahiz v.
Board of Public Works, 8 Gorieb v. Fox," Nectow v. City of Cambridge,40 and Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,"'
these cases relied almost exclusively on established principles of
nuisance doctrine and Lochner-style substantive due process.4 2 Not
only did they fail to contribute in a meaningful way to the developbut they also
ment of a comprehensive regulatory takings doctrine,
43
served to confuse due process and takings analysis.
met with little success. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195 (1983)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge because the provisions do not adversely affect
a fundamental interest nor are based on a suspect criterion); Texaco, Inc. v. Short,
454 U.S. 516,540 (1982) ("Since the exception furthers alegitimate statutory purpose
and has no adverse impact on persons like the appellants who own fewer mineral
interests, the exception does not violate the Equal Protection Clause . ... ");
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) ("The Equal
Protection Clause does not deny the State of Minnesota the authority to ban one type
of milk container conceded to cause environmental problems, merely because another
type, already established in the market, is permitted to continue in use.").
33 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
34See id. at 668-69.

260 U.S. 393 (1922).

3

36Id.

at 415.

272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding constitutionality of comprehensive zoning).
274 U.S. 325 (1927) (upholding constitutionality of comprehensive zoning
scheme).
39 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (upholding set-back
ordinances).
277 U.S. 183 (1928) (invalidating zoning measures as violative of the plaintiff's
due process rights).
41 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (invalidating zoning measure requiring consent of
neighbors as precondition of construction).
' See Robert A. Wilfiams,Jr., Legal Discourse,Social Vision and the Supreme Court's
Land Use PlanningLaw: The Genealogy of the LochnerianRecurrence in First English
Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 427,440-46 (1988) (explaining that
the cases above were decided under principles of substantive due process and
nuisance law).
4 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
7
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Thus, takings jurisprudence was forced to develop against the
background of a fully-developed, albeit repudiated, substantive due
process model. Indeed, the jurisprudential vacuum that was the
Takings Clause could not avoid being filled in part by principles of
die process analysis. Those who brought claims based on the
Takings Clause undoubtedly desired the same results that might
have been achieved in an earlier day by invoking the Due Process
Clause. It seems logical that lawyers and jurists would borrow what
they could, either consciously or unconsciously, from the forms of
analysis with which they were already familiar.
B. The Enlightened Path Not Followed: The Misunderstood Holding
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
In 1922, Oliver Wendell Holmes's opinion for the Court in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon' established the principle that a
regulation limiting the use of property that "goes too far... will be
recognized as a taking" 45 requiring just compensation in accordance with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 46 Mahon
therefore stands as a seminal case establishing regulatory takings
analysis. 4
As such, it is correctly looked to as a fundamental
source of takings jurisprudence. 4' Holmes's opinion in Mahon,
however, has largely been misread by modem commentators. 49
Indeed, its misinterpretation may have "generated most of the
0
current confusion about takings."

concurring) (explaining that Euclid "fused the two express constitutional restrictions
...

into a single standard").

260 U.S. 393 (1922).
4Id.
at 415.
4 The Takings

Clause also applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Such was the case in Mahon. See id.
4" Holmes's opinion in Mahon is generally credited with establishing what has
come to be referred to as the "diminution in value test." See, e.g., Carol M. Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561,
562 (1984).
48 One scholar has described Holmes's opinion in Mahon as "the most important
and most mysterious writing in takings law." ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 156.
Interpreting
it has been compared to "scaling Everest." Id.
49
See Strong, Due Process, supra note 3, at 591 ("[C]ritics, on and off the High
Bench, have consistently failed to grasp the genius of Holmes in his masterful
exposition of the constitutional principles that controlled the decision.")
o Rose, supra note 47, at 562. Although some commentators have criticized
Mahon for establishing what they see as a hopelessly unworkable diminution in value
test, see, e.g., Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1063 ("[T]he 'too far' test is inescapably
vague."), commentators have, with few exceptions, largely ignored other problems
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In Mahon, the Pennsylvania Coal Company challenged the
constitutionality of the Kohler Act, a 1921 Pennsylvania statute that
prohibited "the mining of anthracite coal in such [a] way as to cause
the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a
human habitation."5 1 Prior to the enactment of the Kohler Act,
the Pennsylvania Coal Company had sold the surface rights to
various parcels of land while expressly reserving not only the
subsurface mineral rights, but the right to support of the surface as
52

well.

At the time, Pennsylvania recognized three separate estates in
land: (1) the right to the surface; (2) the right to the subsurface
minerals; and (3) the right to subjacent support of the surface. 3
Thus, the Kohler Act effectively transferred what was previously
recognized as a distinct estate in land, the right to subjacent
support, from the Pennsylvania Coal Company to the owners of the
54

surface.

Although Mahon is usually treated simply as a Takings Clause
case,5 5 the Pennsylvania Coal Company actually challenged the
Kohler Act on three distinct grounds, alleging: (1) that the Kohler
Act violated the Contract Clause; (2) that the Act violated the Due
Process Clause; and (3) that the Kohler Act effected a "taking"
requiring compensation. Although commentators often treat the
generated by Holmes's opinion in Mahon. In particular, the fact that it does not
explain dearly which clause(s) were responsible for invalidating the Kohler Act and
what the precise test for each should be.
51
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13. It is worth noting that the Kohler Act exempted
"land where the surface is owned by the owner of the underlying coal and is distant
more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved property belonging to any
other
person." Id. at 413.
52
See id. at 412. The original deeds expressly provided that "the grantee takes the
premises with the risk, and waives all claim for damages that may arise from mining
out 5the coal." Id.
3 See JESSE DUKEMINIR & JAMES E. KRiER, PROPERTY 1060 (2d ed. 1988); E.F.
Roberts, Mining with Mr.Justice Holmes, 39 VAND. L. REv. 287, 287-88 (1986); Rose,
supra note 47, at 563.
' SeeMahon, 260 U.S. at 414. As the Court explained, "[The Kohler Act] purports
to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable
estate-and what is declared by the Court below to be a contract hitherto binding the
plaintiffs." Id.
5
1 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 53, at 1060-61 (discussing the Mahon
takings test).
I See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 394-404. Part I of the plaintiff's brief states that "[t]he
statute impairs the obligation of the contract." Id. at 394. Part II alleges that "[t]he
statute takes the property of the Coal Company without due process of law." Id. at
395. Part III and Part IV respectively assert that the regulation is neither "a bona fide
exercise of the police power," id. at 396, nor "a valid exercise of the right of eminent
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entirety of the opinion as simply an exposition on the Takings
Clause, a close reading of the opinion suggests that it was roughly
organized by Holmes into two fairly distinct parts, the first addressing the Due Process and Contract Clause challenges and the second
addressing the Takings Clause argument.
In the first part of the opinion, Holmes postulated the following:
"If we were called upon to deal with the plaintiffs' position alone,
we should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a public
interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the
defendant's constitutionally protected rights." 57 Commentators
have seized upon this language as evidence that Holmes intended
to establish some sort of a balancing test, weighing the value of the
public interest advanced by the regulation against the value of the
private property taken or destroyed by the regulation. 58 This
language is also used to support the proposition that the Takings
Clause impliedly forbids the taking of private property for any use
other than public use-that is, to take property merely for the
private benefit of another.5 9 What some observers have failed to
understand, however, is that these comments were made in the
context of a general discussion of the validity of the Kohler Act, not
under the Takings Clause, but under the Due Process and Contract
Clauses.6" While Holmes had specifically made reference to the

domain" which can only be accomplished with just compensation. Id. at 404.
5
1Id. at 414.
ss See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 53, at 1061.
69 See, e.g., id. at 991 ("The Fifth Amendment's mention of 'public use' [in the
Takings Clause] is read to mean that property may be taken only for such uses....");
Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REv. 203,
205 (1978) ("[C]ourts have universally read [the Takings Clause] as a proscription
against takings for a private purpose.").
A noteworthy example of the application of this misunderstanding can be found
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In Keystone,
the Court attempted to distinguish the case, though factually identical to Mahon, by
asserting that "important public interests are served" by the regulation. Id. at 485.
Recognizing that they were walking on very thin ice, however, the Court went on to
argue in the alternative that "petitioners have also failed to make a showing of
diminution of value sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in PennsylvaniaCoal...."
Id. at 492-93. The Keystone Court, however, was somewhat disingenuous in suggesting
that a land use regulation would survive scrutiny under the Takings Clause merely by
satisfying the public use requirement. Even if the reference to "public use" in the
Takings Clause does establish a requirement that a regulation be enacted for the
benefit of the general public, making the public use limitation the entire takings test
controverts the true import of the Takings Clause.
' This is confirmed by Holmes's comment that the implied limitation police
power places on the enjoyment of property rights "must have its limits, or the
contract and due process clauses are gone." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. It is conceivable
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Due Process and Contract Clauses within the immediately preceding
discussion, he had neither mentioned, nor impliedly invoked the
language of the Takings Clause.6"
As indicated, Holmes's opinion in Mahon was organized into two
distinct parts. The first part of the opinion, culminating in the
statement that "the statute does not disclose a public interest
sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's
constitutionally protected rights,"6 2 merely discussed the general
failure of the Kohler Act to pass constitutional muster under the
Due Process and Contract Clauses for want of an overriding public
interest.6" The first part of the opinion did not establish a "public
use requirement" under the Takings Clause;' it simply held that
the statute was not constitutionally permitted under the Due Process
and Contract Clauses. Such analysis was required, since at the time
these clauses had been held to provide substantive protection of
property rights that could only be overcome by the advancement of
a more weighty public interest. 65 As one distinguished constituthat Holmes considered the Takings Clause to be part of the Due Process Clause and
was therefore referring to it in the first part of the opinion as well. Such a
conclusion, however, is belied by the fact that Holmes, later in the opinion,
specifically referred to the language of the Takings Clause as "[tihe protection of
private property in the Fifth Amendment," id. at 415, rather than simply referring to
it as a part of the Due Process Clause.
61
See id. at 412-14.
62
Id. at 414. *
' The belief that the Court should defer to the legislature's determination of what
constitutes a legitimate public interest had not yet become dominant in American
jurisprudence. When Mahon was decided in 1922, the nondeferential substantive due
process analysis of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating regulation
of bakers' working hours), was still controlling, Holmes's vigorous dissent in Lochner
notwithstanding. It was not until 1934 that the Court began to reject the Lochner
approach and adopt a more deferential standard. See supra note 5.
" Although the Court had previously held that takings for private use are
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, see; e.g., Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry., 208
U.S. 598, 605 (1908), the Court had also specifically noted that the Takings Clause
was not directly applicable to the states either of its own force or through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 607. Indeed, the language of the Takings Clause
had been purposefully omitted from the Fourteenth Amendment. See Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877) ("If private property be taken [by a state] for
public uses without just compensation, it must be remembered that, when the
fourteenth amendment was adopted, the provision on that subject, in immediate
juxtaposition in the fifth amendment with the [Due Process Clause], was left out
65 See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), where the Court stated:

[To satisfy due process] it must appear.., that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference .... In other words, [the legislature's] determination as to what
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tional scholar of the period explained:
To take property for other than a public purpose; to take, for
instance, the property of one citizen and transfer it to another,
would be a deprivation thereof without due process of law; and such
a proceeding is equally unconstitutional when the appropriation
is accompanied by full compensation.... For, under our Constitution, the State is incapable of itself interfering or of conferring any
right to interfere with private property unless it is needed for
public objects....
... [I]t devolves upon the courts to declare ultimately whether or
not the appropriation is for a public purpose.66
Another treatise author wrote in 1909:
It is ... well settled that a taking for private use ...

is a depriva-

tion of property without due process of law, and if a State
attempts to authorize such a taking, and the owner, for any reason,
cannot successfully invoke the [Takings Clause] the broad
67
protection of the due process clause comes into play.

Considering that a regulation challenged under the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause had to advance the public
interest in order to pass constitutional scrutiny,6" a corollary public
use requirement under the Takings Clause would have been merely
duplicative. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that Holmes would have
is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is
subject to the supervision of the courts.
Id. at 137.
66 Lucius P. MCGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
255-56 (1906) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). McGehee was a Professor of
Law at the University of North Carolina as well as an Associate Editor of the
American and English Encyclopedia of Law, Second Edition. His comments appear
to reflect the prevalent view of the time. Indeed, they substantially undermine the
assertion made by Professor Strong that "historically it has been substantive due
process that has drawn the line between taking and nontaking." STRONG, DICHOTO-

MY, supra note 3, at 205. Strong asserts that only those regulations which violate
substantive due process require compensation. See id. ("[T]he Taking Clause simply
dictates what must ensue when a taking has been found. It is necessary to look [to
the Due Process Clause] to determine whether there has been a taking."). McGehee's
statements, however, prove that the law has always been that a regulation which
violates due process is void, regardless of whether it is compensated.
67
PHii P NICHOLS, THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN: A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES WHICH AFFECT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC
USE § 31, at 33 (1909). The author continues by noting that: "Appeal to the [Due

Process Clause] has been found necessary in several instances. It was made several
times in States which had not adopted the [Takings Clause], and the due process
clause in the State Constitution was held to carry the necessary protection." Id.
6' See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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wanted to establish another source of the very samejudicial inquiry
that he had opposed in his Lochner dissent.69 Even if Holmes had
begrudgingly come to accept the Court's approach in Lochnerby the
time of Mahon, it is highly doubtful that he would have desired to
create another tool for that superlegislative inquiry.
Commentators have suggested that what they perceive to be the
rather vague and general treatment of the Takings Clause" is
simply a manifestation of the "deep difficulties""' the case presented for Justice Holmes.7 2 Holmes, however, apparently had little
difficulty with the case, and made little, if any, effort to provide a
7
comprehensive exposition on the meaning of the Takings Clause. 3
Indeed, evidence suggests that although Holmes strongly believed
his decision to be just,7 4 the opinion may have been "dashed off in
75
a great hurry."
Even if Holmes perceived what we now refer to as the Takings
Clause to be merely part of what he called the "Due Process
Clause,"76 it is highly unlikely that it was the language of what we
now refer to as the Takings Clause which he found to establish the
public use requirement. 77 As Holmes states later in the opinion,
"[t]he protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment
presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Note that commentators have erroneously perceived Holmes's balancing
language and discussion of the lack of a public interest as part of his treatment of the
69

70

Takings Clause. When they are correctly understood merely as part of a separate

treatment of the case under due process, the remaining treatment of the takings can
be seen as a rather simple expression of the "diminution in value test."
11 AcKERMAN, supra note 2, at 163.
7See id. at 156-65.
" With the exception of the establishment of the "diminution in value test,"
Holmes's opinion in Mahon merely parallels the argument made in the brief for the
plaintiff in error. See supra note 56.
7
4 See 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 109 (Mark D. Howe ed. 1941)
(stating that "the public only got on to this land by paying for it and ... if they saw
fit to pay only for a surface right they can't enlarge it because they need it now any
more than they could have taken the right of being there in the first place").
75 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 2, at 63 n.2.
76
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
Although Holmes's dissent in Lochnerdemonstrates that he personallybelieved
in a more deferential standard of review than that employed by the court at the time,
see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), it does
not mean either that the legislation would have survived scrutiny under what he felt
to be the properly deferential standard, or that he was so stubborn as to refuse to
apply the standard established by the Court over his objection.
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not be taken for such use without compensation."78 The only
grounds upon which Holmes could have confidently believed that
the Takings Clause "presupposes," (i.e., "assumes") rather than
"requires," a public use is the conviction that the Due Process
Clause, either through its procedural or substantive component,
independently bars governmental acts which do not serve the public
79
interest.
The significance of the specific reference to "public use" in the
Takings Clause is not meant hereby to be diminished. Indeed, it
communicates the view, undoubtedly held both by the framers of
the Constitution and the Mahon Court, that the Constitution
permits no governmental action inconsistent with the rule of law or
80
enacted for the personal aggrandizement of a preferred group.
The specific reference to "public use" in the Takings Clause
certainly implies that government cannot take property for private
use, but it does not necessarily imply that the protection is provided
by the Takings Clause. Rather, all it demonstrates is that the
framers believed that the Due Process Clause-whether or not they
believed due process to encompass substantive as well as procedural
rights-would guarantee that government act only in the "public"
interest.
Only after having addressed the Due Process and Contract
Clause challenges in the first half of the opinion, and having
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional for want of a
sufficiently compelling public interest, did Holmes turn to the more
novel question of whether a regulation can so deprive the owner of

value as to essentially constitute a "taking" requiring compensation." His analysis of the Takings Clause issue proceeds from the
8

Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
Such a view would have been fully consistent with the jurisprudence of the time.
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
80 See McGEHEE, supra note 66, at 255, 271 (asserting that transfer of property
from one private citizen to another is a violation of due process); see also Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (finding that interests must be of the public, not of
a particular class). One of the principal concerns which guided the framers in the
design of the Constitution was the desire "to break and control the violence of
faction." THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 41 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
Indeed, the framers recognized that "the most common and durable source of
factions has been the various and unequal distribution ofproperty," and that"[t]hose
who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in
society." Id. at 43.
" Holmes's discussion of the Due Process and Contract Clauses ends with the
conclusion that "the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant
so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights."
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assumption that the regulation is warranted by a sufficiently
compelling public interest.8 2 In his discussion of the Takings
Clause, Holmes emphasized that private property could "not be
taken for [public] use without compensation,""8 for it was his
concern that "[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change."' Holmes's language makes clear that the
Takings Clause bars government actions which are deemed "takings"
regardless of the existence of a public interest of the greatest
magnitude. As he asserts in the final paragraph of the opinion,
[w]e assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the
conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we
assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of
eminent domain. But the question at bottom is upon whom the
loss of the changes desired should fall. 5
The foregoing analysis suggests that Holmes's opinion in Mahon
was intended neither to establish a public use requirement nor to
establish any form of balancing test under the Takings Clause.
Although the language in the first part of the opinion has been
interpreted to the contrary, a more compelling argument can be
made that the first part of the opinion addressed only Due Process
and Contract Clause analysis.8 6 Regardless of what type of analysis

Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414. After reaching that conclusion, Holmes embarks upon a
discussion of the Takings Clause and makes no further reference to the Due Process
Clause, the Contract Clause, or anything else resembling a public use requirement or
balancing test. See id. at 414-16. The change in Holmes's subject of discussion is
marked by a transitional paragraph which reads:
But the case has been treated as one in which the general validity of the act
should be discussed. The Attorney General of the state, the dty of
Scranton, and the representatives of other extensive interests, were allowed
to take part in the argument below, and have submitted their contentions
here. It seems, therefore, to be our duty to go farther in the statement of
our opinion, in order that it may be known at once, and that further suits
should not be brought in vain.

Id. at2 414.
8 See id. at 415.
3

Id. at 415.

"Id. at 416.
85 Id.
' If all of the plausible interpretations of Holmes's opinion in Mahon were
reduced to equations, they would look as follows:
1) NoI=T
2) I<P=T
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Holmes actually sought to establish in Mahon, it is clear that he
failed to the extent that the opinion was unable to clearly settle even
the most general principles of takings jurisprudence. Its lack of
clarity, if nothing else, has contributed to the subsequent resurrection of elements of substantive due process.
II.

THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE BLENDING PHENOMENON

The desire to achieve the same results once obtained by resort
to substantive due process gradually led the Court to embrace
several tests that had once been employed under the rubric of due
process. The principal manifestations of this blending phenomenon
include the public use requirement, balancing, and the substantial
relationship test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. The
following Section discusses each of these in turn, explaining their
illegitimate genealogy, discussing their flaws, and demonstrating
how they threaten the long-term vitality of takings jurisprudence as
a guarantor of private property rights.
A. Ends Analysis: The Public Use Requirement
Whether or not Mahon endorsed or employed such a doctrine,
the principle that the reference to "public use" in the Takings
Clause implicitly forbids takings for other than public use has
become well accepted in takings jurisprudence."7 The following

3) I<PorNoI=T
4) P>X=T
5) P>X,orNoI=T
6) P>XorI<P=T
I = public interest advanced by regulation
P = value of private property rights destroyed by regulation
X = threshold at which a regulation constitutes a "taking"
T = "taking"

The foregoing analysis suggests that equation number four is the only correct
interpretation of Holmes's opinion in Mahon, for only it contains neither a public use
requirement nor a balancing test. The test it does contain is the only true legacy of
Holmes's opinion in Mahon, the so-called "diminution in value test." See supra note
47.
I submit that Holmes would maintain that the absence of a valid public interest
(equation 1) would prove fatal under the Due Process Clause, even though it would
not under the Takings Clause.
The equations in this note were devised by Professor Frank I. Goodman of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School and are printed with his permission.
17 As Professor Merrill explains:
American courts have long construed [the reference to "public use" in the
Takings Clause] to mean that some showing of "publicness" is a condition
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analysis demonstrates, however, that the historic foundations upon
which the public use requirement has beenjustified are flawed. The
cases cited as establishing the public use requirement were actually
based on principles of natural law" and substantive due process 9
rather than the language of the Takings Clause. Although they have
since been misinterpreted to be takings cases, such cases were never
intended to stand for the proposition that the Takings Clause
establishes a public use requirement. Moreover, the public use
requirement serves no practical purpose in contemporary takings
jurisprudence. 0 Yet while the public use requirement, according
precedent to a legitimate exercise of the power of eminent domain. Thus,
when a proposed condemnation of property lacks the appropriate public
quality, the taking is deemed to be unconstitutional and can be enjoined.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 61 (1986);
see also DUKEMINIER, supra note 53, at 991 (stating that the prevailing view is that
property may be taken only for "public use"); GERALD GuNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 485-87 (11th ed. 1985) (arguing that the modern Court interprets "public use"
broadly).
See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
89
See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
o The level of review demanded by the public use requirement was significantly
diminished by Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-34 (1954), and was essentially
equated with the minimum rationality review of due process by Hawaii Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-43 (1984). In Berman, the Court held that the legislature
is "the main guardian of the public needs," and that thejudiciary's role in "determiningwhether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow
one." Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. For further evidence of the great flexibility of the
public use requirement, see Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455,458-60 (Mich. 1981) (holding that the condemnation of land to convey
it to General Motors as a factory cite had a sufficiently public purpose because it
would benefit the community by creating jobs and tax revenues); City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 841-44 (Cal. 1982) (holding that property rights in
a professional football team are a legitimate subject for an exercise of eminent
domain).
While I believe that Professor Merrill agrees with my characterization of the
public use limitation as being devoid of practical significance because of its reliance
on ends analysis, Merrill suggests that new life could be breathed into the public use
limitation by transforming it into a form of means analysis. See Merrill, supra note
87, at 66-74. Merrill would recast the inquiry of the public use limitation from one
which asks whether the object sought by the government act is legitimate to one
which asks whether, assuming that the government end is legitimate, the use of
eminent domain as a means of accomplishing that end is permissible. In defense of
this reformulation of the public use requirement, Merrill suggests that means analysis
is "more narrowly focused and judicially manageable" than examination of the ends
of government action. Id. at 67. Unfortunately, Merrill's assumption that means
analysis is somehow better than ends analysis is thoroughly indefensible. For the
courts to independently determine the necessity or desirability of the use of eminent
domain would require a fact-intensive inquiry into the feasibility of the use of other
techniques, such as private bargaining in every case, and would thereby both open the

856

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 142:837

to most observers, is a "dead letter,"9 it continues to serve as a
source of confusion and redundancy, particularly in state courts.9 2
1. The Illegitimate Pedigree of the Public Use Requirement
The modern public use requirement has a long and mysterious
history. It was not born suddenly in some landmark opinion of the
High Court; rather, it has evolved slowly over time, waxing and
waning with the winds of political philosophy and practical
necessity. 9s
The first discernible roots of the public use requirement did not
rely on the specific language of the Constitution. Rather, they were
based on principles of "natural law" 94 and the "fundamental
maxims of a free government."9 5 In one of the earliest cases to
which the public use requirement can be traced, Wilkinson v.
Leland,9" the Supreme Court stated:
The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require,
that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be
held sacred. At least no court ofjustice in this country would be
warranted in assuming, that the power to violate and disregard
them; a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice
and civil liberty; lurked under any general grant of legislative
authority, or ought to be implied from any general expressions of
the will of the people. The people ought not to be presumed to
part with rights so vital to their security and well being .... We
know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property
of A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional
exercise of legislative power in any state in the union. On the
contrary, it has been constantly resisted as inconsistent with just

gates to needless litigation and place the courts in a role for which they are poorly
equipped. See J. Clifford Wallace, The JurisprudenceofJudicialRestrain A Return to
the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1981). It would also place the courts in the
position of second-guessing rational policy choices made by the other branches of
government, and would thereby undermine the scheme of separation of powers. See
id. at 8. The Constitution empowers the courts to independently evaluate neither the
desirability of the aims of legislative action, nor the methods chosen to effectuate
those aims, in the absence of a constitutional mandate to the contrary.
9' Merrill, supra note 87, at 61.
See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
9s See generally Note, The Public Use Limitation, supra note 19 (describing the
development of the public use doctrine in state and federal courts).
94 Id. at 600.
9' Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
96 See id. at 657.
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principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced. 7
Without a reference to either the Due Process Clause or the
Takings Clause, the Court held in Wilkinson that it was beyond the
power of a state legislature to take property from one person merely
to give it to another."8 It is important to note that Wilkinson
invalidated a Rhode Island statute which essentially had the effect
of transferring property from one person to another, despite the
fact that the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet even been
ratified. 9
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment has always been
understood to apply only to the federal government.'
Thus, in
Wilkinson a public use requirement was found to exist notwithstanding the absence of any directly applicable textual support in the
Constitution.
Though it may shock our constitutional scruples today, what the
Supreme Court did in Wilkinson was common practice in the state
courts of the time.'
Even when state constitutions did contain
express constitutional provisions upon which a public use requirement could be based, state courts generally preferred to rely instead
on principles of political philosophy and natural law. 10 2 Thus, the

9

Id. at 657-58.

98 See id.

" Wilkinson was decided in 1829,39 years before the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868.
"0See Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U.S. 490, 492 (1893) ("The Fifth Amendment operates exclusively in restriction of Federal power, and has no application to
the States."); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 166 (1887) ("[T]he first ten Articles of
Amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the state governments in
respect to their own people, but to operate on the National Government alone.").
101It is important to recall that until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
there was no provision in the federal Constitution prohibiting the states from taking
property, even for private use. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)
(holding that the Takings Clause is not applicable to state legislatures). Moreover, the
federal government did not assert its own power of eminent domain in federal court
until 1875. See Note, The Public Use Limitation,supra note 19, at 599 & n.3. Thus,
most of the earliest cases dealing with what we now call "takings" were based on state
constitutional law. See id. at 599-600 & nn.2-3.
1
' See Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain,
20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 616 (1940) [hereinafter Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use];
Note, The Public Use Limitation, supra note 19, at 600; see also 1 LEWIS, THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 10, at 21 (3d ed. 1909) (discussing law of
eminent domain as a settled principle of universal law); 1 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 118-19 (2d ed. 1917) [hereinafter NICHOLS, THE LAW] (treating
the role of "natural justice" in takings law); cf. J.A.C. Grant, The "HigherLaw"
Background of Eminent Domain, 6 WIs. L. REv. 67, 70-71 (1931) (noting that in states
without "takings" provisions, natural law was applied).
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public use requirement was not at first extrapolated from the
language of the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or
even from analogous provisions of the constitutions of the several
states. Instead, it was derived from a more basic conception of the
limited nature of free government and a strong belief in the
importance of the sanctity of private property to the security of
03
liberty.1
Wilkinson was not the only case in which the Supreme Court
invalidated redistributive measures which did not conform to the
Court's natural law view of the "public interest." Fifty years later,
in Loan Association v. Topeka,1'T the Court held that no tax could
constitutionally be levied unless for a public purpose.'0 5 The
Court expressly stated that "where the purpose for which the tax
was to be issued... was purely in aid of private or personal objects,
the law authorizing it was beyond the legislative power, and was an
unauthorized invasion of private right." 05 Just as in Wilkinson,
the Court failed to point to any specific provision of the Constitution which declared such a tax "beyond the legislative power," but
rather rested its decision on general notions of political philosophy
or natural law. The Court justified its holding by simply asserting
that:
[T]here are such rights in every free government beyond the
control of the State.
There are limitations on such power which grow out of the
essential nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of
individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist,
10' As stated by one author:

Modem American folklore assumes that democracy and liberty are all but
identical.... But the Founding Fathers thought that the liberty with which
they were most concerned was menaced by democracy. In their minds
liberty was linked not to democracy but to property.... Freedom for
property would result in liberty for men ... [a]mong the many liberties,
therefore, freedom to hold and dispose property is paramount.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO
MADE IT 12-15 (1974); see also JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE

OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 72-73 (1988) ("Property was liberty because property

secured independence. Material goods were valued... as a guarantee of individual
autonomy."); cf Baker, supra note 6, at 776 ("[M]arket freedom and freedom of
speech are fundamental aspects of liberty.").
104 87

U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).

o See id. at 664 ("We have established, we think, beyond cavil that there can be
no lawful
tax which is not laid for a public purpose." (emphasis omitted)).
14
o Id. at 662 (emphasis added).
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and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name.
No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute
no
which enacted... that the homestead now owned by A. should
07
longer be his, but should henceforth be the property of B.'
Justice Clifford's vigorous dissent, in an opinion somewhat
08
reminiscent of Justice Holmes's famous dissent in Lochner,1
forcefully asserted that "neither the State nor Federal courts can
declare a statute of the State void as unwise, unjust, or inexpedient,
nor for any other cause, unless it be repugnant to the Federal
Constitution.""' Further, he argued that "[c]ourts cannot nullify
an act of the State legislature on the vague ground that they think
it opposed to a general latent spirit supposed to pervade or underlie
the constitution, where neither the terms nor the implications of the
instrument disclose any such restriction.""' To do so, he maintained, would "make the courts sovereign over both the constitution
and the people, and convert the government into a judicial
despotism.""'
With time, the positivist view advanced by Justice Clifford began
to take root both on and off the Court." 2 Accordingly, the Court
made greater efforts to ground its decisions in the specific language
of the Constitution. The Court, however, had already embraced the
public use limitation-a broad principle which could not easily be
made to fit into one constitutional pigeonhole.
The Court at first rejected arguments that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited states from taking private property without
just compensation.
In Davidson v. New Orleans,"' the Court
expressly rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment made
107 Id.

at 662-63.

I's The issues presented by the Court's approach in Wilkinson are really quite
analogous to those presented by Lochner. Ultimately, the question is one of the
proper role of the Court as a coequal branch of government, and the proper degree
of faith
9 and deference owed to the legislative branch.
'o Loan Ass'n, 87 U.S. at 668 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
0
" Id. at 669 (footnote omitted) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
" Id. (footnote omitted).
112 See NICHOLS, THE LAw, supra note 102, at 119-20 (noting acceptance of
doctrine that courts could not strike down a legislative act unless it violated a specific
provision of the Constitution); Note, The Public Use Limitation, supra note 19, at 602
(describing courts' abandonment of "natural law" for strict constitutional interpretation). For an illustration of the rise of positivism and the decline of natural law see
Southern Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The
... law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified .. .
Is 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
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114
the protection of the Takings Clause applicable to the states.
Although the Court in Davidson essentially held that a state could
lawfully deprive an owner of property without compensation so long
as procedural due process were afforded,"' it never supposed that
6
a state could take property for other than a public purpose.1
Interestingly, however, the Court did become receptive to the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment established a public use
limitation.17
When ultimately forced to decide the issue in

114 See id. at 105.

"' See id. As the Court explained:
If private property be taken for public uses without just compensation, it
must be remembered that, when the fourteenth amendment was adopted,
the provision on that subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth
amendment with the one we are construing, was left out, and this was taken.
It may possibly violate some of those principles of general constitutional
law, of which we could take jurisdiction if we were sitting in review of a
Circuit Court of the United States, as we were in Loan Association v. Topeka.
But... it is not possible to hold that a party has, without due process of
law, been deprived of his property.., when.., he has ... a fair trial in a
court ofjustice ....
Id. (citations omitted).
"' Just eight years later, in Cole v. City of La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885), the Court
explicitly reaffirmed the proposition that "[t]he general grant of legislative power in
the Constitution of a State does not enable the legislature, in the exercise either of
the right of eminent domain, or of the right of taxation, to take private property...
for any but a public object." Id. at 6. The Court continued by explaining that
"[t]hese limits of the legislative power are now too firmly established by judicial
decisions to require extended argument upon the subject." Id. The Court also noted
that "[t]he decisions in the courts of the States are to the same effect." Id. (citations
omitted).
" The Court appears to have first seriously considered the argument in Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896). Although the Court did not
ultimately rule on the issue, Justice Peckham explained:
In the Fourteenth Amendment the provision regarding the taking of private
property is omitted, and the prohibition against the State is confined to its
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
It is claimed, however, that the citizen is deprived of his property without
due process of law, if it be taken by or under state authority for any other
than a public use, either under the guise of taxation or by the assumption
of the right of eminent domain. In that way the question whether private
property has been taken for any other than a public use becomes material
in this court, even where the taking is under the authority of the State
instead of the Federal government.
Id. at 158.
It is also worth noting that although Justice Peckham alluded to the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, thereby raising the suggestion that the mention of
"public use" in the Takings Clause establishes a public use requirement, he refused
to acknowledge it as establishing such a limitation and noted that, in any event, it
"applies only to the Federal government." Id.
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Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska,' it expressly held that "[t]he
taking by a State of the private property of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the private use of another, is
not due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth9Article of
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.""
Although Missouri Pacific appears, at first glance, to directly
overrule Davidson, which had held that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not make the Takings Clause applicable to the states, the two
opinions can be reconciled. 2 ° Missouri Pacific holds only that a
state may not take private property "for the private use of another. " 2 It does not go so far as to say that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from taking private property without compensation.'22 Read together, Missouri Pacific and Davidson prohibit
states from taking private property (even with compensation) for
other than public use, but do not prohibit states from taking private
property for public use without compensation. This result is
shocking compared with our contemporary view that the entirety of
the Takings Clause is made directly applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.

23

Nonetheless, if the Court in Missouri Pacficbelieved its opinion
to be consistent with Davidson, it must have believed that the public
use requirement was a function of due process qua due process,
rather than as a function of the Takings Clause operating in
conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a conclusion is
further supported by the fact that the Court in MissouriPacific made
116164

U.S. 403 (1896).

"9 Id. at 417 (emphasis added) (citing Fallbrook IrrigationDist., 164 U.S. at 112;

Cole, 113 U.S. at 1; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877); Loan Assoc. v.
Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874); Murray v. Hoboken Land &Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855); Wilkinson v Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829); and
State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 31 N.W. 365 (1887)).
In time, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment came to be seen
as providing the kind of substantive protection of personal property rights which the
Court had already found to exist in cases such as Wilkinson and Topeka. Due process
became a bulwark for invalidating economic regulations that the Court deemed
unnecessary for the advancement of legitimate public interests.
1' The opinion in MissouriPacific makes no mention of Davidson except to cite it

for the very holding which it seems to directly contradict. See MissouriPac. Ry., 164
U.S. at 417. While it is possible that the Court merely ignored its previous opinion
in Davidson, it is much more likely that the Court believed that the two were not in

conflict.121Missouri Pac.Ry., 164 U.S. at 417 (emphasis added).
122

See id.

123See

Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1984).
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no mention of the language of the Takings Clause in its opinion,
but merely stated that to take for private use "is not due process of
law."' 24 Thus, when the Court rejected the use of natural law and
looked more scrupulously to the text of the Constitution to find
support for the public use requirement, it turned not to the Takings
Clause (as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment), but
rather to the Due Process Clause itself.12 While more recent cases
such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiffl 26 have cited Missouri
Pacific for the proposition that the Takings Clause establishes a
public use limitation, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that both
Missouri Pacific and Wilkinson were based purely on principles of
natural law and substantive due process.
2. The Modern Function of the Public Use Requirement
Although the precise meaning of the public use limitation has
evolved greatly over time, 27 it is clear that the public use requirement currently employed by the Court fails to serve any function
that is not already satisfied by due process. 28
124

Missouri PaC. Ry., 164 U.S. at 417. It is interesting to note that most of the

modern cases addressing the public use requirement of the Takings Clause either
trace their origins to Missouri Pacific or explicitly cite it as establishing a public use
requirement under the Takings Clause, despite the fact that it had absolutely nothing
to do with the Takings Clause. See; e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. While the opinion
of the Court in Midkff encouragingly phrases the public use requirement in the
language of due process, its repeated references to the "Public Use Clause" are
thoroughly disheartening.
125The Court's course of action was entirely proper, for "a land use regulation
advancing an illegitimate public purpose ... does not 'take' property in the
customary sense because of its illegitimacy." Jerold S. Kayden, Land Use Regulations,
Rationality, andJudicialReview: The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (PartI), 23 URB.
LAW. 301, 320 (1991). Indeed, such an interpretation would have been consistent
with the prevailing vision of the purpose and nature of the Due Process Clause.
Among all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, no clause so aptly and fundamentally embodies the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men. See
Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893) ("[D]ue process of law.., is secured if
the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government." (citation omitted)). Indeed, the Due Process Clause
was essentially designed to stand as a shield against arbitrary or capricious acts of
government and to ensure the general and evenhanded enforcement of the rule of
law. See MCGEHEE, supra note 66, at 60.64. As the Supreme Court has explained,
"[t]he words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same
meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Charta." Murray v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855).
126 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
127 See generally Note, The Public Use Limitation,supra note 19 (chronicling various
past interpretations of the public use limitation).
2
' See Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1066 (stating that public purpose analysis

19931
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Even when the Court was far less deferential in judging what
constituted a bona fide public use, the public use limitation was
simply a duplication of the first component of the three-part
129
substantive due process analysis set forth in Lawton v. Steele.
That test required "first, that the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and, [third,] not unduly
80
oppressive upon individuals."
With the decline of substantive due process, 13 ' a public use requirement within the Takings Clause might have continued to
provide an opportunity for substantive judicial review of at least
some forms of economic regulation. The same political and judicial
philosophies which dealt a deathblow to Lochner-style substantive
due process, however, were equally hostile to other types ofjudicial
inquiry into the "ends" of legislative action.13 2 This hostility
toward all kinds of substantive judicial review likely arose from a
feeling that when the judiciary acts as a "superlegislature," it matters
not whether it does so under the rubric of the Due Process Clause
or the Talkngs Clause, for in either case it serves to destroy the
delicate constitutional scheme of separation of powers, and, in so
confuses eminent domain with due process).

152 U.S. 133 (1894); see also Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1065-66 (asserting the
similarity of public purpose balancing test to the Lawton substantive due process test).
130 Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137. The Court continued by noting12

The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests,
arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual or unnecessary

restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as
to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive,
but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Id. The belief embodied in the quotation above that the courts must somehow
supervise the legislature's determination of what constitute desirable public purposes
and the necessary means of their implementation was precisely what was rejected by
the Court when it replaced the Lawton test with the minimum rationality test now
employed by the Court. It would seem enigmatic, at best, to suppose that the Court
would desire to abolishjudicial supervision of "interference with private business, or
...restrictions upon lawful occupations" under the ambit of the Due Process Clause
while retaining that same capacity under the rubric of the Takings Clause.
1 See supra note 5.

" In the words of Justice O'Connor, "[w]hen the legislature's purpose is
legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical
debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates over the wisdom of other

kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts."
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 (1984).
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doing, to undermine the intrinsic value and integrity of the
8
democratic process.1
Indeed, "the crisis in democratic theory generated by judicial
opposition to the New Deal" 4 provided the impetus not only for
the rejection of substantive due process, but for the abandonment
of de novo judicial review of "legislative declarations of public
use."185 The culmination of this judicial philosophy was Justice
Douglas's opinion for the Court in Berman v. Parker,8 5 in which
he proclaimed that "when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." 1 7 It is
interesting to note that although the opinion in Berman cites a
number of cases as supporting judicial deference to legislative
determinations of public use, all of the cited cases are due process
cases. 3' Assuming that the Court knew this, we can only conclude that the Court must have believed that the democratic
principles which necessitated the rejection of Lochner-style substantive due process applied with equal force to the public use requirement of the Takings Clause.
Today, the much-reduced public use requirement'"9 merely
restates the minimum rationality test of contemporary substantive
due process analysis. 4 ' As the Court recently explained, "where
the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause."' 41 Indeed,
the federal courts have found a public use in every takings case

...
For an insightful discussion of principles supporting judicial restraint, see
generally Wallace, supranote 11; Wallace, supranote 90. From a somewhat different
perspective, Professor C. Edwin Baker effectively argues that judicia usurpation of
political decisions under the rubric of the Takings Clause "reduces the incentives for
improving the political process." Baker, supra note 6, at 769.
'" Merrill, supra note 87, at 68.
'15

15
137

Id.

348 U.S. 26 (1954).

Id. at 32.

id.
...
The extremely deferential public use standard now employed by the Court was
established largely by Berman. See id. The opinion is a prime example of the manner
'3 See

in which the Court has repeatedly allowed its due process decisions to influence
takings jurisprudence.
1
40 See GUNTHER, supra note 87, at 487 ("[T]he modem Court is almost as
disinclined to second-guess 'public use' determinations as to curtail police power ends
in due process inquiries.").
1 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). The Court further
explained that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is ... coterminous with the scope of
a sovereign's police powers." Id. at 240.
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since Berman established the highly deferential standard of modem
public use review in 1954.142
There is no apparent reason for the Court to persist in the
charade of a Takings Clause inquiry, when in so doing it merely
employs the same test used in due process analysis. 43 As Professor Stoebuck explains:
The existence of a public purpose is really one of the elements in
the test for due process. The question of public purpose goes to
the question of whether the governmental entity has the power to
impose the particular regulation [even with compensation]. A
regulation is void if the answer to the due process question is
negative, and one need not-cannot-then ask if the regulation is
a taking. Should the answer to the due process question be
affirmative, then one may go on to the taking issue. If public
purpose is considered again at this stage, the taking issue becomes
44
a replay of the due process questions.
What we refer to in the context of takings jurisprudence as the
"public use requirement" is nothing more than "ends analysis"-that
is, judging whether the end is sufficiently legitimate to empower
government to impose the regulation. Ends analysis under the
Takings Clause and due process should not be different. The
concept of "property" need not be limited to physical, tangible
items, but should more properly be seen as encompassing legal
rights and privileges.'45 Some of the more interesting intangible
141 See Merrill, supra note 87, at 94-109 (cataloguing the treatment of takings cases
decided since Berman). Merrill concludes that the federal courts have found a public
use in every case between 1954 and 1986. See id. at 96. My research has disclosed
no cases since 1986 in which the federal courts have failed to find a public use.
1 Any regulation challenged as violative of the Takings Clause could also be
attacked as violative of substantive due process, which is certainly in no danger of
vanishing. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-05 (1992) ("[I]t is
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters
of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure .... ."); see also HAND, supra note
6, at ix ("No Twentieth Century Justice of the Supreme Court has acted on the
principle that [due process] is limited to departures from procedural regularity. None
has acted on the principle that it is limited to precluding [government] from denying
rights specifically set forth in the Constitution.").
' Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1066.
"4See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)
(describing property as "the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to [a]
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it"); EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra
note 2, at 20-24 (discussing the linguistic vagueness and its effect on the conceptualization of property); Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross
Currents in theJurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676-78 (1988)
(setting forth the doctrine of "conceptual severance," which asserts essentially that a
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rights that have been held to be "property" for purposes of the
Takings Clause include: the hunting rights of members of a duck
hunting club, 14 6 and trade secrets taken in the course of pesticide
registration by the Environmental Protection Agency.' 47 Thus,
virtually any economic due process challenge can easily be rephrased by a creative litigator into a takings challenge. To allow the
ends tests of due process and the public use limitation inquiries to
differ, therefore, is to dispense different brands ofjustice according
148
to the form rather than the substance of the case.
Clearly, the Court recognizes the dangers inherent in establishing different standards of public use under the Takings and Due
Process Clauses. In HawaiiHousingAuthority v. Midkiff, it took great
pains to equate the public use requirement of the Takings Clause
with the minimum rationality standard of due process. Nevertheless, I believe that the Court erred in its approach, and should
instead have taken the opportunity to explain that the public use
requirement is and has always been purely a product of due process
and its natural law antecedents.
Although Due Process and Takings Clause inquiries into public
use may be substantially identical in theory thanks to the Court's
opinion in Midkiff, empirical evidence demonstrates that they are
applied differently in practice. Although such dissimilar treatment
is apparently not a significant problem in the federal courts, state
courts are frequently "willing to depart from Berman's virtual
abandonment of judicial review" in their treatment of public use

superficially temporary taking of property may in fact constitute a permanent,
complete taking); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 166 ("Unlike our ancestors, we
no longer count our wealth by looking first to our social property of land, farms,
buildings. Instead, our principal means of support consist of legal property: stocks,
bonds, pensions ... ."); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 787
(1964) (discussing the wealth and benefits distributed by government as a form of
property). For an insightful introduction to the intellectual difficulties presented by
attempts to define "property," see generally Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof
Property, in PROPERTY 69, 69-85 (J.Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
At the time the Constitution was framed, the concept of "property" was certainly
not limited to physical possessions, but included rights and liberties as well. See REID,
supra note 103, at 72 ("[Plroperty, even the concept of property as material
accumulation, was not limited to the physical in the eighteenth century.").
4
See Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir.
1967).
47
1 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
14' Unless, of course, "property" as it is used in the Takings Clause is interpreted
to mean only real property (i.e., land) or physical, as opposed to legal property (i.e.,
legal rights and privileges).
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questions in Takings Clause analysis. 49 Between 1964 and 1985,
over sixteen percent of all public use cases in state appellate courts
invalidated proposed takings on the grounds that the taking did not
serve a public use. 5 Moreover, the percentage of state court
cases finding no public use has almost doubled, from 11.8% for the
period 1954-1960 to 20.4% for the period 1981-1985."l' Although
the Court's reaffirmation of Berman in Midkiff may have been
designed in part to stem this increase in the use of the public use
requirement, Berman is cited in only three of the twenty-four cases
in Merrill's survey decided after Midkiff' 5 2 Clearly, "judicial
enforcement of the public use requirement is not a thing of the
past,"' 53 and it appears likely that only the outright abolition of
the public use requirement will ensure that judicial review will
conform in practice to the constitutionally-mandated' deferential
standard of due process.
Furthermore, eliminating the public use requirement altogether
would ensure that it never returns in a less deferential form. No
matter how remote a possibility such a return might seem in the
near future, the law is seldom static, and the distant future cannot
be easily predicted. Indeed, prominent professors such as Frank I.
Michelman and Richard Epstein have proposed public use tests
which would vastly expand the scope and depth ofjudicial review of
legislative ends in the eminent domain context.'5 5 Any doubt that
the Court would ever use the public use requirement of the Takings
Clause in a manner substantially different from due process should
Merrill, supra note 87, at 96.
See id.
1 See id. at 97. Merrill's survey found that the number of public use cases in each
five-year period was "fairly constant, ranging from 42 to 61 cases in each period from
14

150

1954-1985." Id. Merrill also notes that "the percentage of cases holding that a taking
does not serve a public use generally increases throughout the 31-year period. The

percentages are as follows: 1954-1960, 11.8%; 1961-1965, 12.5%; 1966-1970, 13.1%;
1971-1975,13.7%; 1976-1980,21A%; and 1981-1985,20.4%." Id. Merrill's survey did
not include state trial courts. Rather, it was limited to the presumably more
competent appellate courts. See id. at 96.
152 See id. at 96 n.115.
"I Id. at 97.
154For an argument that a highly deferential standard of review is constitutionally
required, see Wallace, supra note 90, at 6-8.
15 See Epstein, supra note 2, at 166-69 (proposing the "public goods" test);

Michelman,Just Compensation, supra note 2, at 1241 (discussing utilitarian property
theory, which would mandate that only those uses of eminent domain which the court
believes would produce a net benefit to society be deemed to serve the public use).
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be tempered by the fact that the Court has done just that in the
context of means-end scrutiny. As Jerold S. Kayden explains:
The debate over whether a land-use regulation violates due
process, equal protection, or just compensation is more than
academic. To begin with, it is just such a quibble that Justice
Scalia exploited to pen Nollan's footnote three. He embraced the
undeniable fact that the just compensation clause is not the due
process or equal protection clause to invest just compensation's
"substantial" with a different meaning, thereby inventing a higher
56
standard of rationality review than otherwise available.
Purging the public use requirement from takings jurisprudence
would also guard against even more dangerous misinterpretations
of the requirement. In the past, for example, lawyers have argued
that the reference to "public use" in the Takings Clause means not
that the government may take property only for public use, but
rather that government must compensate only when the taking lacks
a public use.' 7 The Supreme Court itself came very close to
following this mistaken reasoning in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis,"5 s where the Court suggested that
Mahon could be distinguished simply on the basis of a finding of a
59
public use.
Of course, so long as the public use requirement is applied by
the courts in precisely the same manner they apply due process,
there is little to fear, for the outcome in any case will be the same.
The greatest danger lies in the potential for the requirement to be
changed in subsequent decisions. Indeed, although the Court's
ends analysis has been harmonized with that of due process, its
means-ends scrutiny has recently diverged from that of due process.
B. Heightened Means-End Scrutiny: The "SubstantialRelationship"
Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
Although the development of the public use limitation can
almost be characterized as ancient history, Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission 16 provides a modern illustration of how
elements of substantive due process continue to be brought back to

" Kayden, supra note 125, at 322-23.
157 See HoRwrrz, supra note 23, at 65;

Merrill, supra note 87, at 71.
1- 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
..See id. at 485-93. Of course, once a court determines that a legitimate public
use exists, it must still address the question of whether compensation is required.
160 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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life under the rubric of the Takings Clause. In Nollan, James and
Marilyn Nollan sought to replace their dilapidated beach-front
61
bungalow with a three-bedroom house and an attached garage. '
As required by state law, the Nollans applied to the California
Coastal Commission for a development permit.1 62 The Commission agreed to grant the development permit, but only on the
condition that the Nollans dedicate a ten-foot wide easement just
inland of the mean high tide line so that the public could cross the
Nollans' private beach as they walked along the coast. 6 While
the lateral access easement would certainly have provided legitimate
benefits to the public,' the Court rejected the easement condition because the easement failed to advance the Commission's
avowed goal of preserving visual access to the sea.1 6' As the Court
explained:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans'
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the
new house. It is also impossible to understand... how it helps to
remedy any additional congestion on [the public beaches] caused
by construction of the Nollans' new house.166
The opinion would not have stirred much controversy had it
merely affirmed the due process requirement that a regulation bear
some "rational relationship" to a legitimate government objective.
Justice Scalia indicated, however, that the Court would apply a
heightened standard of means-end rationality to at least some forms
of takings challenges. 167 Justice Scalia's 5-4 opinion for the Court
in Nollan asserted not only that land use regulations which condition development upon an exaction must "substantially advance" 16 a legitimate public interest, but that "the permit condition [must] serve[] the same governmental purpose as the develop169
ment ban."
161See

id. at 827-28.

162 See id. at 828.
6
1 3 See id. at 853.
"' The Court merely assumed that the Commission's purposes were legitimate.
See id. at 835.
16
See id. at 838-39.
1
6 Id.
167
See id. at 834 n.3.
'RId. The traditional formula for means-end scrutiny is that the legislation must
be "rationally related" to a legitimate state interest. See e.g., Railway Express v. New
York, 336 US. 106, 109 (1949) (articulating the rational relation test).
" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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Most importantly, Justice Scalia argued in footnote three, that
the standards to be applied in Takings Clause cases are not the
same as those to be applied in due process or equal protection
cases. As Justice Scalia explained:
Contrary to Justice Brennan's claim... our opinions do not
establish that these standards are the same as those applied to due
process or equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal
formulations in the takings field have generally been quite
different. We have required that the regulation "substantially
advance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved,
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), not that "the State 'could
rationallyhave decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the
State's objective." [Brennan Dissent] quoting Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creameiy Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981). Justice Brennan relies
principally on ... an equal protection case.., and two substantive
due process cases.., in support of the standards he would adopt.
But there is no reason to believe.., that so long as the regulation
of property is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due
process challenges, and equal protection challenges are identical
170

While Justice Scalia criticizes Justice Brennan for relying
"principally on an equal protection case ... and two substantive due
process cases " 171 to support the application of the deferential
"rational relationship" test, he fails to recognize that his "substantially advance" formulation is "directly traceable" 172 to due process
and equal protection cases as well. 17 ' As Professor Kayden explains, "Justice Scalia adopted the word 'substantial' from Agins v.
City of Tiburon ' 7 4 -a Takings

Clause case.
176

Agins,175 however,

merely cites Nectow v. City of Cambridge, a due process case, as
the source of the "substantially advance" language. 77 And Nectow,
in turn, cites Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,'17 also a substantive due process case, as the source of the adjective "substantial.

" 179

,' Id. at 834 n.3 (some citations omitted).
171 Id.
17 Kayden, supra note 125, at 314.
173See id. at 314-16.

174

Id. at 314.

15 447 U.S. 255 (1980).

277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).

176

See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
U.S. 365 (1926).
17 See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188.
1"

1 8 272
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Moreover, while the wording may be somewhat different, there
is significant evidence that Justice Scalia's "substantially advance"
terminology has historically had the same deferential meaning in the
takings context asJustice Brennan's "could rationally have decided"
These "adjectives [have been] used interchangeformulation.'
ably by the Court ...

for more than sixty years to describe the

necessary relation between means and ends."' 8 '
While it intuitively seems just that government should only take
property for uses directly connected with the avowed public use, the
Court's holding in Nollan implicates many of the same concerns as
In light of Nollan and its semantic
the public use requirement.'
underpinnings, analysis of the public use requirement suggests that
all inquiry into the ends of economic legislation should be conducted under due process and its respective standard. It follows a
fortiori that means-end analysis should thus also be conducted
exclusively under the framework of due process. Surely, if the ends
analysis of the public use requirement is to be defined by due
process, or, in the words of the Court, is to be "coterminous with
the scope of a sovereign's police powers," 83 then means-end
analysis under the Takings Clause should also be identical to that of
due process.
Means-end rationality in the Takings Clause is similar to the
public use limitation in that, "the customary meaning, structure, and
purpose of the [Takings Clause] suggest that means-end rationality
is not a core concern of takings inquiry."184 Indeed, "a land-use
regulation advancing an illegitimate public purpose or irrationally
advancing a legitimate one does not 'take' property in the customary sense because of its illegitimacy or irrationality."8 5 Means-end
rationality is, however, the historic guardian against arbitrary and
" See Kayden, supra note 125, at 302-09 (asserting that the pre-Nollan cases
employed deferential review despite the use of the adjective "substantial"). Kayden
further concludes that:

[T]here is nothing in the just compensation clause ... to suggest that
"substantial" expresses a higher standard than "reasonable," "rational," or
"conceivable".... As the Court originally made clear in Euclid,Zahn, Gorieb,
and Nectow, the judicial role in reviewing rationales underlying land-use
regulations (as with all forms of socioeconomic legislation) is greatly limited.
Id. at 316.
81
Id.
s See infra part H.
, Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
8 Kayden, supra note 125, at 320.
' Id.
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capricious legislative action, and therefore, a particularly central
186
concern of due process.
8 7
Nollan should, by all right, have been a due process case,
for the central issue presented in the case is whether government
should be able to deprive a person of a right he or she should have
been able to enjoy for a purpose unrelated to the public interest by
Perhaps Justice Scalia's
which the state justifies its restriction.'
discussion in the case should not be focused on efforts to expand
the scope of the Takings Clause, but rather to suggest alternative
methods of ensuring due process where the current minimum
rationality standard fails. The Court has already held, in other
contexts, that substantive due process is satisfied if any rational
relationship exists between the means employed by government and
a legitimate end sought to be achieved, regardless of what the
government's actual purpose may be.8 9 By requiring the permit
condition to advance the same purpose as the development ban,
Justice Scalia actually requires an examination of the actual or
avowed purpose of the exaction, rather than a determination of
whether a conceivable rational relationship exists. If, for example,
the Coastal Commission had declared its public purpose to be
increased use access, rather than visual access, an easement of
lateral access would have substantially advanced a legitimate public
purpose.
If the Court is now unhappy with the level of means-end scrutiny
provided by due process, it should correct this problem at the
source, rather than by making an end-run around due process via
the Takings Clause.'
Such efforts not only "direct[] attention
..See supra note 125.
18 One commentator has described Nollan as "an attempt to uphold the rule of
law against the potential for official arbitrariness." Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henly
George and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1731, 1751 (1988). The phrases "rule of
law" and "official arbitrariness" smack of due process.
" As Professor William A. Fischel notes: "Whether some citizens should be
denied the right to rebuild their homes in a manner that seems perfectly consistent
with California beachfront housing patterns seems to have evaded the dialogue
between Justices Scalia and Brennan." William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian
Balancingand Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1588 (1988).
...
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (supporting
the validity of legislation which "rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators").
190 If Nollan were to invest the Takings Clause with a uniformly higher level of
scrutiny than is permitted under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,
"judicial review of private property regulations under due process and equal
protection [would become] nugatory." Kayden, supra note 125, at 323.
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away from the Court's deeper concern with fairness,"191 and
subject takings jurisprudence to the same criticisms which ultimately
discredited Lochner-style substantive due process,' 9 2 but they also
divert energy and attention away from the resolution of the most
significant Takings Clause problem-the establishment of a principled and workable means of defining what constitutes a "taking."
C. Balancing
Much of the academic debate over the Takings Clause has
focused on the relative merits of a balancing approach as compared
to the categorical approach' 9 3 gradually being established by the
modern Court.194 The purpose of this Section is not only to
reiterate the general debate over the propriety of balancing or to
explain broadly why balancing is an inefficient and unjust methodology for takings jurisprudence, but to address the ways in which
Professor Michelman suggests that ifNollan is not narrowly construed as applying
only to cases in which a permanent physical occupation is threatened, litigants will
rush to plead "taking" in order to invoke heightened means-end scrutiny. As
Michelman explains:
What follows if we take at face value the proposition that takings claims, like
free-speech claims, beget heightened scrutiny as compared with ordinary
economic due process and equal protection claims?... [W]henever someone
challenges a land-use regulation as a taking, rather than challenging it as a
simple deprivation of property without due process, there will be an obvious
problem of how to tell whether the case really and truly involves a takings
challenge meriting intensified means-end scrutiny.
One possible answer is that it isjust a matter of pleading... Any aggrieved
owner prefers intensified scrutiny and thus would plead "taking," not "deprivation without due process" or "denial of equal protection."
Michelman, supra note 3, at 1613.
191Kayden, supra note 125, at 331.
192Indeed, active nondeferentialjudicial review of legislative "ends" and "means"
is especially subject to criticism because of its anti-democratic nature and because of
the threat it poses to the constitutional scheme of separation of powers. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Two Faces of Liberalism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 245, 245 (1986) (criticizing
Richard Epstein's Takings as relying on the same set of beliefs as the Lochner Court
and noting that they foundered, in part, because of the "institutional strain on so
aggressive ajudiciary").
193 See e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocey: A Comment on Michelman,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1697 (1988) ("[E]ven a very imperfect, but clearly
articulated, formal takings doctrine is likely to be superior to open-ended balancing.")
194Some commentators have suggested that the Court has reacted against
balancing in its recent decisions and is moving toward a per se categorical approach.
See Michelman, supra note 3, at 1621-22 (noting that the Court seems to be moving
"towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings doctrine"); Radin, supranote 145, at
1681-82 (discussing the apparent move of the Court towards a more formal method
of takings jurisprudence).
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balancing merely duplicates substantive due process analysis, and
thereby robs takings jurisprudence of its true and independent
significance.
1. Is The Court Really Balancing?
To a large extent, commentators have been unable to reach a
consensus on whether the Supreme Court actually employs a
balancing approach, comparing the relative value of the private
property rights destroyed to the value of the public interest being
advanced, 195 or merely engages in ad hoc factual determinations
regarding the magnitude and character of the destruction of private
property rights. 196 Yet, regardless of whether the Supreme Court
actually employs a balancing test, there is certainly "a balancing
'strain' running through the eminent domain opinions." 9 7 Indeed,
practitioners generally believe that regardless of what methods the
courts say they are employing, they are actually doing nothing more
98
than balancing.

195 For an explanation of the balancing test, see Michelman, Just Compensation,
supra note 2, at 1193 (explaining that the "contemplated gain of society" should be
compared with the harm to the individual).
1 For commentary expressing the belief that the Court is actually engaged in
balancing, see Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 37-41 (arguing that courts consider
"whether the public interest advanced is worth the price").
7Stoebuck,supra note 3, at 1065 (citingTurnerv. County of Del Norte, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 93, 96 (Ct. App. 1972) (balancing county's interest in control of flooding with
remaining economic uses for plaintiff's land)); see also William Murray Builders, Inc.
v. City ofJacksonville, 254 So. 2d 364, 366-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that
city's interest in preserving residential neighborhood was insufficient to deny property
owner the only use of his land for which it was reasonably adapted), appealdenied, 261
So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1972); Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75, 7879 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (comparing burden imposed on the Trustees with a disproportionately small benefit to the public welfare gained by preserving the building), rev'd, 288
N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 1968).
There is even language in the recent case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), suggesting that a balancing approach is actually
employed when no per se test is applicable. See infra notes 226-32 and accompanying
text.

" See, e.g., Robert H. Freiich, Update on the Taking Issue and Eminent Domain
Decisions, in 1 PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND
COMPENSATION 97, 103 (ALI-ABA Land Use Inst. ed., 1992) (noting that after Lucas,
if an owner is not deprived of 100% of the value of land, "the inquiry will return to
the balancing of interests").
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2. Why Balancing Fails as a Takings Methodology
a.

Society's Interests Are Not Necessarily in Conflict with Those of the
Individual

Balancing suggests that "there are persons in society whose
interests can somehow be excluded from, and counterpoised
against, 'society's interests.'" '99 Imagining that the person from
whom the government intends to take private property has interests
opposed to those of society makes it easier to justify forcing him to
yield. But the individual from whom property is being taken does
not necessarily have interests which conflict with those of society.
The owner of property being taken or regulated for the public
benefit may himself believe the cause for which his land is being
taken to be a noble one. His only conflict of interest with society
is over who should bear the costs of the regulation or taking.
Although society would like to force the burdened individual to
bear the entire cost of the taking himself, the individual would
prefer to have society compensate him for his loss and distribute the
costs throughout society.
When viewed in this light, the individual's claim to compensation is more difficult to reject. Why should one individual bear the
entire cost of a regulation which benefits others or society as a
whole? Should not those who enjoy the fruits of government action
contribute to defray the costs of such action?
b. BalancingFails to Ensure Fairnessto the Politically Weak and Does
a PoorJob of Maximizing Efficiency

Although balancing may or may not be an efficient takings
test,2"' the principal concern of the Takings Clause is not necessarily the net maximization of social value or utility. 20' While efficiency is undoubtedly an important aim, the most fundamental
concern embodied in the Takings Clause is that of fairness-that
government not advance public interests at the expense of particuI" Michelman,Just Compensation, supra note 2, at 1194.

200 For arguments that balancing is an inefficient takings methodology, see RoseAckerman, supra note 193, at 1700-02.
201While efficiency concerns are certainly valid and important, they should be

secondary to fairness concerns. The Constitution often tolerates inefficiency as the
necessary price ofsecuringliberty. The Constitution's elaborate system of checks and
balances, for example, reduces the potential for tyranny but does so only at the
expense of governmental efficiency.
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lar individuals and minorities. 20 2 It is founded upon a justifiable
fear of the evils of faction, and the framers' understanding of the
potential for a democratic majority to oppress and exploit political
20 3
minorities.
Meaningful judicial review is most important under circumstances in which there is reason to believe that the political processes
have failed. 204 Indeed, it is highly likely that the political processes will fail to protect the individual when government seeks to take
his property for the use of society as a whole. 20 5 Since every
member of society other than the burdened individual will gain
through his loss, the individual will likely find few, if any, political
allies.
Balancing, however, fails to provide the sort of meaningful
judicial review needed to protect individuals from the natural
shortcomings of the democratic processes in the takings context.
For a court to uphold a regulation under a balancing approach, it
must find that the value of the public interest advanced by the
regulation is greater than the value of the private right being
destroyed. Yet even if this condition is satisfied, balancing does not
necessarily ensure that the site chosen for the exercise of eminent
domain is the most cost-effective, rather than just the one which
subjects the government to the least amount of political pressure.
Thus, balancing tests fail to protect the politically weak or isolated

" See Douglas W. Kmiec, The OriginalUnderstandingofthe Taking ClauseIs Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1665 (1988) ("[A]voidance of disproportionately placed burdens is the essence of the just compensation requirement."); Sax,
PolicePower,supra note 2, at 57 ("[T]he English and American authorities writing at
about the time of the adoption of the fifth amendment also viewed the provision as
a bulwark against unfairness, rather than against mere value diminution.").
"0 See Fischel, supra note 188, at 1582 (noting that the real problem addressed by
the Takings Clause is "of political majorities ganging up on effete minorities"); Sax,
PolicePower,supra note 2, at 57 ("What seemed to concern the early writers was...
the exercise of arbitrary or tyrannical powers .... The examples they give suggest a
principal fear of ill-considered, hasty, or even discriminatory impositions created by
the pressing necessity of the state to get a job done ... ."); see also JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT 77-88 (1980) (discussing the plight of minority groups in
representative government); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
204 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating
that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" might "seriously... curtail the
operation of... political processes" and would, therefore, require "more searching
judicial inquiry").
...
See Kmiec, supra note 202, at 1640 (describing the "constitutional structure" as
"designed to counteract the majoritarian tendency to isolate individual citizens for
disproportionate burdens").
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from bearing a disproportionate burden of the costs of regulation.

20 6

Moreover, balancing clearly provides inadequate protection of
property rights. In almost all cases, the government's interest will
have a more lofty and noble-sounding purpose than that of the
individual. Since the judiciary can only evaluate the subjective
values of the private and public interests, it is very likely that the
judiciary will find society's interests more compelling. In fact,
between 1922 and 1987 the Supreme Court "never once dearly
favor of a takings claim
applied the open-ended balancing test20 in
7
and against a regulating government."
c. Balancing Subjects Takings Analysis to the Criticisms of Lochner
Without Answering the Central Question of Whether Society or the
Individual Should Bear the Costs of Regulation
Balancing also -fails as a takings methodology because it is
merely duplicative of the outmoded due process analysis of
Lawton 20 8 and Lochner,219 which has so thoroughly been rejected

by the Court in other contexts. 210 Indeed, it is characterized by
the same weaknesses and is susceptible to the same criticisms as
Lochner-style due process. 211 It is now regarded as fundamental
that judgments regarding the desirability of social and economic
regulation-judgments which naturally rely on a balancing of the
respective costs and benefits-are properly within the scope of the
legislative, and not the judicial branch of government. As Professor
C. Edwin Baker notes, even "[c]riteria like the Chicago-school
206 Although

the person whose land is condemned is theoretically compensated
fairly for the loss, such compensation does not include any idiosyncratic value which
may be lost. Thus, from the perspective of the person whose land is being
condemned,
the compensation will almost always seem inadequate.
20
Michelman, supra note 3, at 1621.
208 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (stating that the state must exercise its police powers
through reasonably necessary means and for the benefit of the general public).
20 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that the state cannot interfere with contract

rights without legitimate and substantialjustification for the use of its police power).
211See Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1066 (arguing that it is inappropriate to use the
Lawton balancing test as an eminent domain taking test in that it would lead to

appropriation without compensation when a strong public need existed and "[t]hat
no court would reach this result").
21 For an enduring criticism of the substantive due process approach of Lochner
and Lawton, see Holmes's dissent in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes,J., dissenting)

(arguing that "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory"); see also supranote 5 (discussing cases which reject the doctrine of substantive
due process in the economic context).
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economists' notions of 'efficiency' and 'wealth maximization' are
meaningful only in relation to a given set of goals." 212 Thus, to
attempt to effectuate the commandment of the Takings Clause with
the intellectually and doctrinally bankrupt shell of substantive due
process is to deprive the clause of its intended effect and to discard
the protection of liberty which the Takings Clause affords. The
Takings Clause demands a more exacting form of scrutiny than that
now afforded by modern substantive due process, but to substitute
the failed approach of Lochner-style substantive due process is
unimaginative and unhelpful, if not certainly doomed to fail.
A balancing approach necessarily weighs the social gain
contemplated by the regulation against the individual losses
occasioned by it. While such a test ensures that the regulation will
only be valid if it tends to increase net social value, it does not
resolve the fundamental question of who should bear the costs of
the regulation. As Justice Holmes noted in Mahon, "the question at
bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes desired should
fall"211-not whether the desired changes should be permitted at
all. Balancing fails to answer the most difficult, partially normative,
question of who should bear the costs of regulation. It does provide
a framework for deciding when an exercise of eminent domain is
socially advantageous, but that, in reality, is the type of analysis
properly left to the legislative and not the judicial branch of
government.
III. THE FUTURE
In recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a desire
to breathe new life into the Takings Clause and to ensure that
private property rights receive meaningful constitutional protection.
One can only wonder what further steps the Court might take to
revitalize the Takings Clause. While the Court has enhanced the
protection of private property in a number of ways, two developments are particularly relevant to the issues presented in this
Comment.
The first is Nollan's rejection of the minimum rationality
standard of due process and its holding that an exaction must
"substantially advance" a "legitimate state interest." 214 It is unBaker, supra note 6, at 767.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
214
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
212

21
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clear whether the Court will, in the future, find the substantial
relationship test to apply to all takings cases or whether it will limit
or reject its application in cases other than those involving exactions. If the substantial relationship test is to endure, it cannot be
justified simply on the ground that older cases such as Nectow and
Euclid employed the "substantially advance" language. This is
especially true considering that Nectow and Euclid were decided
under due process analysis before the rejection of Lochner-style
substantive due process.
The second development is an attempt, reflected first in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,215 and more recently in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,216 to reduce the necessity
for ad hoc determinations by establishing categorical rules delineating situations in which a per se taking has occurred. This effort is
laudable not only because it will produce more workable rules and
provide guidance to lower courts, but also because it implicitly
rejects balancing and any other examination of the public use
advanced by the regulation. What remains to be seen is whether
Loretto and Lucas are the beginning of a process that will ultimately
result in a general transformation of takings jurisprudence from a
body of ad hoc decisions to a formal set of categorical rules or
whether Loretto and Lucas will remain isolated exceptions from the
general rule that takings will be judged by ad hoc factual determinations.
A. Putting Carolene Products, to Task: Can Landowners Be a
Discrete and InsularMinority?
As discussed earlier, Nollan rejected the application of the
minimum rationality standard of due process to takings challenges
and held that an exaction must "substantially advance" a "legitimate
state interest," and that "the permit condition [must] serve[] the
same governmental purpose as the development ban. "217 While
the requirement that the permit condition serve the same governmental purpose as the development ban would seem to be limited
by its very nature to the case of exactions, it remains to be seen just
how broadly the Court will invoke the substantial relationship test.
The Court has four options available to it: (1) it can reject the
215458
216 112
217

U.S. 419 (1982).
S. Ct. 2886 (1992).

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834, 837.
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substantial relationship test and apply the rational relationship test
employed in due process analysis generally; (2) it can limit the
applicability of the substantial relationship test to cases such as
Nollan in which the governments seeks an exaction; (3) it can
establish a set of criteria for determining when heightened meansend scrutiny under the substantial relationship formula should be
undertaken that would not necessarily limit its application to cases
involving exactions; and (4) it can find that the substantial relationship test applies to all takings cases.
If the substantial relationship test is to endure in any form,
however, it must be justified by more than semantics. Although the
treatment of Nollan above suggests that the substantial relationship
test is directly traceable to Nectow, Euclid, and the substantive due
process analysis of the Lochner era, 218 it may be possible to justify
an exception from the minimum rationality standard for certain
types of regulatory takings.
This Comment has already suggested that the Takings Clause
does not provide for any independent test of means-end rationality
and that only the Due Process Clause requires such scrutiny. Thus,
if a compelling rationale for the substantial relationship test is to be
developed, it must conform to the principles enunciated by the
Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 2 9 Although the
Court's opinion in Carolene Products established the deferential
standard of due process review of social and economic legislation
known as the "rational relation" test, it did suggest that higher
scrutiny would be appropriate to protect "discrete and insular"
minorities which might not effectively be protected by the political
process. 221 While racial minorities have typically been the beneficiaries of this notion, there is no reason why other types of minority
groups should not benefit from an exception to the rational relation
standard if there is reason to believe that their interests may be so
discrete from the remainder of the population or their number so
limited that they are unprotected by the political process.
A zoning measure, property tax, or other land use regulation
which applies to a large number of individuals probably does not
warrant review under any standard other than the deferential
rational relation test. Since a large number of individuals would be
affected, they would presumably have the economic and political
211 See supra notes 37-43, 160-90 and accompanying text.
219304 U.S. 144 (1938) (establishing the "rational relation" test).
20
' See id. at 152-54 & n.4.
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strength necessary to ensure that their interests are represented and
to expose any unfairness or wrongdoing associated with the
regulation.
Exactions such as those involved in Nollan, however, present a
different set of circumstances. When individuals or small groups of
individuals are singled out by government and forced to surrender
property rights, they may have little ability to appeal to the political
process. Few in number and possessing limited resources in the
aggregate, they may have little or no ability to affect the outcome of
the political process. If an exaction is required of an individual, she
may not even be aware that there are other similarly affected
individuals with whom she may unite for political purposes. Even
if an appeal to the electorate at large were possible, the electorate
may be unsympathetic to a rich individual. Worse still, the
electorate may in fact be the beneficiary of the exaction or land use
restriction. If, for example, one individual's land is so restricted
that it can only serve as a green belt, neighboring landowners may
sympathize with the plight of the affected landowner, but they may
support the land use restrictions nonetheless since they may benefit
in the form of enhanced property values due to reduced supply of
improvable land and the environmental and aesthetic benefits of the
green belt. In sum, a government which takes from a few and gives
to many may be quite popular indeed.
In fact, Justice Stevens has noted that the "principle of generality is well-rooted in our broader understandings of the Constitution
as designed in part to control the 'mischiefs of faction.'"221 As
Richard Epstein has explained:
The generality requirement in turn is said to lead to the conclusion that regulations are suspect when they "single out" individual
landowners to bear the brunt of special exaction, so that any broad
based zoning plan is far less likely to meet with constitutional
222
difficulty than a plan targeted to a small group of individuals.
While members of the Court have noted that the scope of a
regulation is a factor to be considered in determining whether a
taking has occurred, they have failed to establish a nexus between
the standard of review to be applied and the generality with which
a regulation affects the electorate.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2923 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV 955, 967 (1993).
221
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Situations exist under which heightened review of the means-end
fit of government regulations affecting land is warranted. Although
application of the substantial relationship test is not justified for all
takings cases, it may be defensible when the regulation affects a
limited class or number of individuals and where the majority of the
electorate may actually benefit by imposing the costs of the
regulation on a few individuals. The challenge before the Court
now is to develop a set of standards for determining when application of the substantial relationship test is warranted and to
demonstrate in its cases the empirical and logical necessity of its
use.
B. Signs of Hope and Despair in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council22 the Court held that
any regulation which completely deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use of land is a taking requiring compensation,
regardless of the importance of the public interest advanced by the
regulation.2 24 The establishment of this additional per se test is
part of an effort by the Court to further the process of establishing
straightforward principles of takings jurisprudence which will
provide workable standards for lower courts to follow.2 2
The
opinion reflects a decision by the Court to reduce, to the extent
possible, the ad hoc nature of takings jurisprudence and to
institutionalize a more workable and practical categorical approach
226
to the issue.
While Lucas appears to create another category of regulations
which are per se invalid under the Takings Clause, the test established by Lucas is somewhat less revolutionary than one might

Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886.
" See id. at 2893-94: The Court previously suggested such a rule in Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
2' The Court had previously recognized that a permanent physical occupation of
property is a per se taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
"6 See Michelman, supra note 3, at 1621-25 (discussing the rise of "categorical
takings doctrine" and the "demise of balancing"); see also Gregory S. Alexander,
Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1752, 1753 (1988) ("Some
commentators, including Frank Michelman and MargaretJane Radin, have detected
a methodological shift in recent takings decisions, a reaction against open-ended
balancing. Specifically, they have pointed to the categorical reasoning of the Court
2"

in Loretto ..

. ."

(footnotes omitted)).
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imagine. The per se test promulgated by the Court in Lucas only
invalidates those regulations which leave the owner of land with no
viable economic use. While this standard may be triggered in the
most extreme cases, it will doubtless affect only a handful of cases,
for few, if any, land use regulations leave the owner with absolutely
no economically viable use of his land. Moreover, the most
restrictive of all land use regulations may yet slip through the cracks
of the Lucas test. For example, imagine a regulation which forbids
the owner of a large tract of undeveloped land from building any
structures or removing any resources from the land. While the land
owner's property has essentially been taken by the government for
use as a green belt, it may not be possible to say that the land owner
is left without any economically beneficial use of the land. The
owner could possibly charge a fee for nature lovers, bird watchers,
or hunters to enter upon the land. Indeed, even land which was so
restricted as to permit no use whatsoever might yet have some
economically viable use-it would always have some speculative value
since there would always be the chance that the government would
lift the restriction.
There is also language in the opinion which raises questions
about the depth of the Court's understanding of the fundamental
issues involved in Lucas. In the same breath with which it proclaims
the recognition of two classes of cases in which no ad hoc factual
determination need be made,2 2 it describes a balancing test for
those cases which remain. The opinion posits that when the two
classifications are not applicable to the case at bar, the Court will
return to "case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in
support of the restraint."22 While it had always been clear that
229
the Court would have to resort to "ad hoc, factual inquiries"
when no per se test disposed of the case, the language of Scalia's
opinion takes a step backward by suggesting that the Court actually
engages in balancing.
It is important at this juncture to highlight a critical distinction
between "ad hoc, factual inquiries" and "balancing." While "balancing" certainly requires case-specific factual determinations, it is
achieved by comparing the value of the private property rights
See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (discussing regulations that constitute a physical
invasion of property and regulations that deny all economically beneficial or
productive use of the land).
us Id. (emphasis added).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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destroyed to the value of the public interest advanced by the
regulation. 23 0
"Ad hoc, factual inquiries" are precisely what
Holmes mandated in Mahon, but the factual inquiries which Holmes
envisioned in Mahon did not involve, in any way, an examination of
the public interest advanced by the regulation. 2 1' Rather, Mahon
suggested simply that the effect of a regulation should be evaluated
to determine whether the regulation so significantly impairs the
rights of the owner as to appropriately be characterized as a taking.
The reference to balancing made injustice Scalia's opinion must be
an unintended error since the fundamental premises upon which
the opinion stands are decidedly in opposition to the interjection of
the magnitude of the public interest into the calculus of takings
jurisprudence. 2 2 If the public interest could justify the elimination of 99% of the value of a landowner's property without
compensation, why could it not warrant the elimination of 100% of
the property's value? Obviously it could. If the Court believed in
balancing, it would have held in Lucas that the deprivation of all
economically beneficial use constitutes a taking unless warranted by
a sufficiently compelling state interest. Instead, the Court chose to
hold that the complete elimination of economically beneficial use
constitutes a taking regardless of the public interest. What the
justices may not have realized is that they simply applied Holmes's
diminution in value test as it has been interpreted in this Comment.
If that test is to have any significance at all, it must require the
invalidation of a regulation which deprives the owner of all
economically beneficial use, and as suggested above, that test
presupposes that a public interest exists which warrants the taking
but which also warrants the payment of just compensation.
Assuming, as I think we must, that the aforementioned language
referring to balancing is but an inadvertent error, the fundamental
holding of the Court's opinion in Lucas stands as a beacon of hope
in the sea that is takings jurisprudence. Indeed, it represents an

...
See Michelman,Just Compensation,supra note 2, at 1193 (describing "balancing
test" as weighing of social gains against private losses).
231See supra notes 44-86 and accompanying text.
22 If a court may not examine the public interest when a regulation deprives the
owner of all economically beneficial use of land, then why should a court ever
examine the public interest? While application of Holmes's diminution in value may
require "ad hoc, factual determinations", it certainly does not suggest that the public
interest should in any way become a part of that calculus. See supra notes 44-86 and
accompanying text.
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implicit rejection of balancing,23 and demonstrates fidelity to the
2 4
takings jurisprudence established by justice Holmes in Mahon. 3
CONCLUSION

Takings jurisprudence is already hobbled by the lack of a clear
and practical test of what constitutes a "taking." The principal
thrust of the Court's efforts should thus be turned to defining more
precisely the standards of its "ad hoc, factual determinations" and
what that calculus should properly entail, as well as attempt to
facilitate the continued advancement of a categorical approach to
the takings problem. The Court must seek to find an independent
baseline for judging when a regulation crosses the threshold and
"goes too far." But the Court must reject efforts to use the Takings
Clause as a means to accomplish what can no longer be done under
the rubric of substantive due process. Thus, all forms of ends and
means-end analysis, including the public use requirement, the
substantial relationship test, and balancing should be purged from
While heightened means-end
takings jurisprudence entirely.
scrutiny is probably justified when a regulation affects only a limited
number of individuals who may not effectively be protected by the
political process, the substantial relationship test should be
established as an exception to the rational relation test of due
process, rather than some product of the Takings Clause.
Our muddled takings jurisprudence desperately needs to be
made clear and workable if it is not soon to befall the same fate as
Lochner. Indeed, the erroneous infusion of due process analysis into
takings jurisprudence has long been a source of confusion and
redundancy in addressing the issue of regulatory takings. By
understanding the functional independence of the Due Process and
Takings Clauses, one can more clearly perceive the narrow, but vital
function of the Takings Clause, and contribute to its effectuation.

"' If the Court were actually balancing, then the per se test of Lucas would not
always be appropriate since there would still be occasions when the public interest
outweighed the private loss.
' One commentator has suggested that the Lucas majority did little more than
apply Holmes's analysis in Mahon. See Donald Large, Lucas: A Flawed Attempt to
Redefine the Mahon Analysis, 23 ENVTL. L. 883, 883 (1993). For a discussion of Mahon,
see supra notes 44-86 and accompanying text.

